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The atmosphere had already become tense long before the election results were announced in Georgia. Between April and May, the approval of the "On Transparency of Foreign Influence" law, which restricts the activities of civil society organizations and independent media, led to significant protests. This was followed by the "Family Values and Protection of Minors" law in September, which adversely affects the LGBT+ community and, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “imposes discriminatory restrictions on education, public debate, and meetings concerning sexual orientation.” These two laws are nearly identical to those already in place in neighboring Russia.
The European Council responded by effectively halting Georgia's accession process to the continental bloc, to which it has been a candidate since late last year. In October, the European Parliament issued a resolution stating that Georgian Dream (GD), the ruling party since 2012, “has promoted an increasingly authoritarian agenda,” that “government officials are fostering a climate of hatred,” and called on the EU and its Member States to impose personal sanctions “on all those responsible for undermining democracy in Georgia,” including Bidzina Ivanishvili, the party's founder, the country's wealthiest man, and the informal leader of the government. Both he and Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze repeatedly announced they would outlaw all opposition parties if re-elected in the October 26 elections.
Five months earlier, on May 26, Independence Day, President Salome Zourabichvili presented the Georgia Charter, a document aimed at uniting opposition parties and forming a technical government to implement the reforms requested by the European Union. Nineteen parties signed the pact, including the three coalitions and the individual party which, along with GD, had the best chances of surpassing the 5% threshold to enter Parliament.
It is worth questioning whether Zourabichvili was violating the Constitution by promoting a particular political sector, considering that the Head of State must be nonpartisan, and her role is limited to that of “guarantor of national unity and independence,” according to the Constitution. Article 78 of the Constitution calls for taking all necessary measures to ensure Georgia’s integration into both the EU and NATO, so promoting a pro-European coalition against a government that both the European Parliament and the European Council blame for the de facto suspension of the accession process could be considered legal.
The polarization on a local level between a conservative and a liberal sector becomes more relevant on the international stage. While the opposition looks toward the EU, the government looks the other way. It is not that GD is necessarily a pro-Kremlin party, but Ivanishvili accumulated his wealth in Russia, his government has benefited from commercial and financial outsourcing following sanctions imposed on Moscow over the invasion of Ukraine, and it calls for avoiding confrontation with the northern giant. Campaign posters from the ruling party compared images of perfectly intact buildings and infrastructure (schools, churches, gyms, bridges) in Georgia with scenes of destruction in Ukraine. The message was clear: GD guarantees stability and peace (with Russia), while the fragile united opposition leads to war. Other public posters displayed opposition politicians on leashes with the phrase “no to foreign agents.”
A week before the elections, the opposition and the president participated in a massive rally in central Tbilisi under the slogan “Georgia Chooses the EU.” In response, the government held its campaign closing rally three days later in the same place, but unlike the previous rally, this time the area was filled with buses that had transported supporters from various regions to the capital. While the first rally gathered regular citizens, particularly from Tbilisi, the second showcased the extensive state apparatus at the service of the ruling party.
In this context, Georgia held its first elections as an EU candidate and the first to use electronic voting. Allegations of irregularities emerged early on: double voting, intimidation, the expulsion of local and international observers from polling stations, vote-buying, and violence against opposition party members.
According to Georgia's Central Election Commission (CEC), Georgian Dream received 54% of the votes, while the four groups that signed the Georgia Charter collectively garnered just under 38%. Curiously, exit polls conducted by independent organizations painted a very different picture: around 40% for the ruling party, and nearly 52% for the opposition. The U.S.-based pollster Edison Research, whose exit polls in the last four Georgian elections have been particularly accurate relative to the final results, with a maximum margin of error of 3%, this time claimed that GD would receive 13% less than what was officially announced—figures that raise some suspicion.
Additionally, the ruling party typically receives greater support in rural areas, small cities, and towns than in the capital. In the last two elections, the difference between these regions ranged from 3% to 7%. This time, the government officially received nearly 30% more in rural regions than in Tbilisi. Particularly striking are the numbers in regions predominantly inhabited by ethnic minorities, often poorer and less developed areas. For example, in Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki, Armenian-populated areas, and in Marneuli, with an Azerbaijani population, official results in favor of the government hovered around 90%.
Adding to this is the curious fact that a party that has been in power for 12 years, faced major protests over the last two years, and been heavily criticized by the very European institutions it supposedly aims to join, has not suffered electoral fatigue. On the contrary, it officially garnered 30% more votes now than in 2016 and 20% more than in 2020. It is indeed a remarkable and striking achievement to gain such support in this context.
According to the report from the joint observation mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and the European Parliament, there were instances of voter pressure and intimidation, frequent violations of ballot secrecy, and allegations of vote-buying. The report also highlights the significant financial imbalance between the ruling party and the opposition, as well as recent amendments granting control over the selection and nomination process of the CEC to the ruling party. In other words, Georgian Dream was in charge of the official vote count.
Meanwhile, the local mission of Transparency International found “serious and substantial violations,” and its assessment describes “a complex plan for electoral fraud, executed through methods such as disrupting the verification system, violating marking procedures, and obstructing observers.”
Reports from other international organizations, such as the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), echoed similar findings.
While Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Margarita Simonyan, director of the Russian channel RT, congratulated Ivanishvili even before the first official numbers were released, representatives of the four groups that signed the Georgia Charter announced they would not recognize the results. They spoke of “rigged elections” and a “coup,” with three of them declaring that their members would not take seats in Parliament, deeming it illegitimate. President Zourabichvili joined the protest, describing the electoral process as “a farce” and “a Russian special operation.”
Zurab Khrikadze, a former electoral official and Georgian civil activist, opines that “what happened is sad, but the government had been preparing for manipulations for a long time: public employees were intimidated—if you don’t vote for the party, you lose your job; or the false dichotomy of ‘if you vote for the opposition, you choose war; if you vote for Georgian Dream, we guarantee peace.’ Added to this is the manipulation of ethnic minorities: for over three decades, successive governments have done nothing for the linguistic and civic integration of ethnic minorities in the south of the country, regions the government has always viewed as their voting reservoir due to how easily vulnerable ethno-religious minority communities can be manipulated and intimidated. The vote-counting technology also raises some doubts about the integrity of the machines’ functioning.”
What happens in the coming days could mark an important change of direction for this country. On the one hand, there is the Belarusian path, with a government clinging to power through greater repression and media manipulation. On the other hand, the Georgian path: the 2003 parliamentary elections also saw significant allegations of fraud against a government then perceived as all-powerful. What followed were 20 days of protests known as the Rose Revolution, which ended with the president’s downfall, the rise of a new generation of pro-Western young politicians, a constitutional change, and even a new flag.
A third possibility is 2020, just four years ago, when the opposition also refused to recognize the results and initiated a parliamentary boycott that lasted six months and was only resolved thanks to an agreement facilitated by the European Council. The difference now is that there is a war in Ukraine, and the European Union does not want to see one of its candidate countries moving closer to Russia. Adding to the complexity, the Armenian government was one of the first to congratulate Georgian Dream. The defeat of pro-Western parties in neighboring Georgia could jeopardize Armenia’s new European orientation, as Yerevan, particularly since last year, views its (former?) historical ally in Moscow with growing mistrust.
